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In the Supreme Court
Of the State of Utah
GENERAL MILLS, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, doing
business under the trade name of
SPERRY FLOUR COMPANY,
Western Division of General Mills,
Inc., and ZURICH GENERAL
ACCIDENT AND LIABILITY
IXSUR.:\..XCE CO)!PA~~' Lil\IITED,
Plaintiffs,

No. 6192

\S.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTA..H and OLGA LASSEN HANSEN,
Defendants.

DEFEl\TDAJ.~T

OLGA LASSEN HANSEN'S BRIEF

ADDITIONAL

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

In the proceedings or hearing held at Ogden, Utah,
June 5, 1939, Commissioner Knerr stated, on pages 2,
3 and 4 of the record, what the record showed and
then asked of the representative of the Sperry Flour
Company, Neil R. Olmstead, the following question:
"Are you willing to admit that on March 17, 1938,
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Mari us Hansen was injured by reason of an accident
arising out of or in course of his employment by the
Sperry Flour Company 1''
Mr. Olmstead: "Just a moment. I have an objection that I would like to state for the record.'' When
granted permission, Mr. Olmstead said: "On behalf
of the Sperry Flour Company and the Zurich General
Accident and Liability Company its insurance carrier,
I object to any proceedings on this application filed
for the reason that it includes therein a claim for
disability and compensation for the period from June
1, 1938, to April 18, 1939, and that this applicant, or
these applicants, are not entitled to apply for or receive
compensation for the period of disability that existed
prior to Mr. Hansen's death.
"I make that objection to the application as a whole,
and I have a further objection to make, and I make
an objection as follows:
''On behalf of the Sperry Flour Company and
the Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance
Company, Ltd., I object to that portion of the application wherein claim is made for disability compensation
for the period from June 1 to April 18, 1939, for the
reason that the applicants are not entitled to apply
for or receive compensation for the period of disability
that existed prior to Mr. Hansen's death."
Com. Knerr : "Your objection as to that is overruled. I take it you are familiar with the Supreme
Court decision on that in the Park case.''
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3
Are you willing to admit that on March 17, 1938,
the deceased herein was injured by reason of an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment
while employed by the Sperry Flour Company T''
Mr. Olmstead: "We will so admit."
Com. Knerr: ''Are you willing to stipulate that
as a result of said injury he died on April 18, 1939 T''
Mr. Olmstead: "We will not so stipulate."
Com. Knerr: ''Are you willing to stipulate that
Marius Hansen on the date of his injury was paid a
wage amounting to the sum of $240.00 per month working six days per week T''
Mr. Olmstead: "Yes."
Com. Knerr: "Are you willing to stipulate that
the (page 5) applicant is the widow of the deceased T
And was living with him at the time of the injury 1
And was dependent on him for her maintenance and
support?''
Mr. Olmstead: "Yes."
Com. Knerr: "And that a minor daughter, June
Hansen, 18 years of age on May 2, 1939, was the daughter of the decedent and was living with him at the time
of his accident and that she was dependent on him for
her maintenance and support up to the time of his
deathT"
Mr. Olmstead: "We will stipulate as to that."
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Com. Knerr: ''The only question at issue is as
to whether or not Marius Hansen who was injured on
March 17, 1938, by reason of an accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment while employed
by the Sperry Flour Company, and as to whether or not
as a result of said injury he died on April 18, 1939;
and also the question as to whether or not the applicant would be entitled to be paid compensation on account of temporary total disability suffered by Marius
Hansen on and after June 1, 1938, up to the date of his
death April 18, 1939 ~ ''
Mr. Olmstead: "The only claim with respect to
the death benefit is the question as to whether or not
death was the result of the accident that occurred on
J\iarch 1, 1938 ~''
Com. Knerr : ''Correct.''
Mr. Olmstead: "And the question of whether or
not this applicant is entitled to receive any benefits
during the period of June 3, 1938, to the date of Mr.
Hansen's death~''
Com. Knerr: "Yes. That is a matter of law."
Mr. Olmstead: "Yes, or a matter of fact."
The above is the entire record as to any stipulations
mentioned then.
On page 25 of the report of the hearing at Salt
Lake City, Utah, on July 26, 1939, appears the followIng:
Mr. Olmstead: "I might state for the record that
at the time of the first hearing the defendants of course
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did not know what they would have at this time and
at that time we were laboring under the impression
that the injury occurred on March 17th in the course
of Mr. Hansen's employment, and at that time it was
stipulated between the parties that Mr. Hansen was
injured on that date, in the course of his employment.
But in view of what I know now it becomes necessary
for me to withdraw from that stipulation and to advise
the parties that we are making an issue on the question
of whether or not Mr. Hansen was engaged in-Mr.
· Hansen was in fact injured in the course of his employment. I state that into the record at this time so that
the other parties may be able to meet the issue."
Com. J ugler: ''We will continue the case until tomorrow afternoon. with the definite understanding that
it will be closed at that time, and if there is any other
reason for a COJ!tinuance after that you will have to ask
for a new hearing.''
Thereupon this matter was continued until the following afternoon at two o'clock.
At Salt Lake City, July 27, 1939, for the first
time an attorney appeared for the applicants and then
the record shows that Dan B. Shields appeared for
them. Esther Peterson was sworn as a witness for
appellant, and on pages 27 to 30 of the record appears
her testimony which in substance is that on a Sunday
evening around ].farch 20, 1938, she was present when
Mr. Hansen was in an automobile collision while he
was operating his car, and only he and the witness were
present; that Mr. Hansen's car was proceeding north
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between seven and eight o'clock as they were entering
Sigurd, and at a turn in the road just before one crosses
the railroad track another car came in an opposite direction at a terrific rate of speed and hit the left front
wheel and fender of the Hansen car and damaged them;
that the other car speeded away and "it gave him a
terrific jolt" and that she didn't know of any other
injuries, that ''he complained of a terrible lump in his
stomach right here. He complained to me about it
and he hadn't complained to me about it previous"
of a pain in his chest. He was able to operate the
car and drove as far as Gunnison where he remained
that night; that she rode with Mr. Hansen on either
Thursday or Friday before this Sunday night from
Centerfield to Richfield and he didn't complain of any
disability at that time to her.

ARGU1IENT
On page 4 of plaintiff's brief they say: "It is not
disputed that l\1:arius Hansen was an employee of the
plaintiffs, that the General Mills, Inc. (Sperry Flour
Company) was at all times herein concerned as an employer under the workmen's compensation law of the
State of Utah, or that if Marins Hansen was injured
in the course of employment he would be entitled to
compensation, or that if he died as a result of injuries
arising out of and in the course of his employment his
dependents would be entitled to compensation. * * *
That Marins Hansen sometime in March sustained
serious injuries is not contested.''
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By turning to page 1 of the record, it will be found
that R. L. Hickman, Office Manager of the Sperry
Flour Company (page 20 of record made in Salt Lake
City) under date of March 25, 1938, made n report,
under the provisions of 42-1-90, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, in which he states that Marins Hansen, an
employee of the Sperry }.,lour Mill Company, who was
being paid $240.00 per month, was ''injured on :March
17, 1938, at 10:30 A. M." while "Driving south of
Payson, Utah, on highway No. 91 when rounding a
curve in the road struck an icy place on the road,
causing car to leave highway throwing :Mr. Hansen
against the steering wheel and wind shield'' and the
exact part of the person injured was ''Ruptured
Stomach'' and that the machine with which the injury
occurred was an ''auto'' and the part injuring him
was ''Steering Wheel'' and on -2- is an Employer's
Supplemental Report of Injury from the Sperry Flour
Company giving Employee's name as Marins Hansen,
Date of Injury 3-17-38 which purports to be signed by
Geo. Hohl, chief accountant and dated 6-2-38. That in
a letter from DeVine, Howell & Stine by Neil R.
Olmstead to the Industrial Commission under date of
March 23, 1939, the date of injury was stated as March
17, 1938, and also in almost all other exhibits the same
date appears.
Under Statement of Errors (page 7 of plaintiff's
brief) the only error assigned is "There is no evidence
whatever in the record that ~Ir. Hansen was injured
while in the course of his employment either on March
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1'7, 1938, or March 20, 1938, near Payson, Utah, and
that if he died as the result of injuries sustained in an
accident it was the accident of ~{arch 20, 1938. ''
To sustain this position, they argue that ''a stipulation which is entered into by mistake or inadvertance
may be withdrawn, and that it is within the sound discretion of the Court to permit the withdrawal of such stipu·~ation provided the other party is not thereby placed at
'a disadvantage,'' and ''that the Commission accepted the
withdrawal of the stipulation by adjourning the case
to permit the introduction of testimony which showed
the stipulation to be untrue and permitted the introduction of such testimony and that neither the withdrawal
of the stipulation nor the testimony was objected to by
anyone and that such evidence is the only positive evidence in the record of the time, place or circumstance
.of an injury to Mr. Hansen."
As noted above, counsel at the hearing in Ogden
was asked if they were willing to admit that on March
· 17, 1938, the deceased herein was injured by reason of an
~ccident arising out of or in course of his employment
while employed by the Sperry Flour Company, and he
answered, ''We will so admit.''
That admission was never withdrawn, nor the admissions made by ~{r. R. L. Hickman made under date
of March 25, 1938, in the report above referred to. After
that admission had been made, there were certain socalled stipulations put into the record, and apparently
..1·it was these that they requested to withdraw.
In Civil Jury Trials by Austin Abbott, on page 413
·it is said:
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''A formal admission of a material fact made
by counsel in course of the trial of the issues
for the purpose of influencing the course of the
trial is conclusive upon the client citing Frey vs.
Myers, Tex. Civ. App., 113 S. W. 592."
1

c. J. 1363:
''In the law of evidence, a voluntary acknowledgment by a party of the existence of the truth
of certain facts, a concession or acknowledgment
made by a party of the existence or truth of certain facts, a statement of a fact against the interest of the party making it, an acknowledgment
of the existence of a fact, of which it is evidence
only in the sense that it dispenses with the proof
of it."

Geobrig vs. Stryker, 174 Fed. 897, 899; 22 C. J.
330, § 370:
"When a judicial admission is once made, it
is, unless the Court permits it to be withdrawn as
having been made by mistake or improvidently,
binding on the parties, and counsel, and even on
the Court itself, except as to matters of law.''
Waldron vs. Waldron, 156 U. S. 361, 39 L. Ed.
453.
Prestwood vs. Watson, 111 Ala. 604-608; 20
So. 600.
Holley vs. Young, 68 MC 215; 28 Am. Rep. 40.
Connor vs. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 168 Mich.
29; 133 N. W. 1003.
In Holley vs. Young, supra, the Court says :

"When admissions are made deliberately and
intelligently, in the presence of the Court and
reduced to writing, they are of the best species
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of evidence, and the parties cannot be permitted
to retract admission of fact, made in any form.''
In Connor vs. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. supra, the
Court said that where there was other proof establishing
the fact admitted at a former trial, admissions cannot
be withdrawn.
As to the stipulations set forth above, they were to
the effect that $240.00 per month was what Mr. Hansen
was paid, and that the applicant was the widow of the
deceased and was living with him at the time of the
injury and was dependent on him for her maintenance
and support and also as to the daughter, June Hansen.
In Brink vs. Ind. Comm., 368 Ill. 607; 15 N. E. 2nd
491, it is held that parties will not be relieved from a
stipulation in absence of a clear showing that the matter
stipulated is untrue, and then only when the application
is to be relieved is reasonably made.
Brown vs. Superior Court, Cal. 52 P. 2nd
256, holds that granting of a motion to set aside
stipulation rests in discretion of the trial court.
Haney vs. Holt, 179 Ark. 403, 16 S. W. 463,
says that failure to set aside a stipulation entered
into between parties' attorneys and reciting defendants indebtedness to plaintiffs held not an
abuse of discretion.
Foot vs. Adams, 248 N. Y. S. 539, 232 App.
Div. 60, held that parties should not be lightly and
unnecessarily relieved from a stipulation entered
into by misapprehension.
Wilder vs. Beach, 245 N.Y. S. 142, 137 Misc.
883, holds that stipulations in open court, made
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part of the record, could be set aside only for
fraud, collusion or mistake, and a failure to
comply therewith was not excused because not
willful.
Clark vs. Deleware and H. R. R. Corp., 283
N.Y. S. 739, 245 App. Div. 447, holds that where
party seeks to be relieved from stipulation relied
upon by adversary, court should not exercise its
discretion if relief would prejudice substantial
rights.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Barlow, 20 N.
Dak. 197, 126 N. W. 233, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 763,
says "While the appellate court will not interfere
with nor control the exercise of the discretion thus
vested in trial court, except in cases of clear
abuse of such discretion, in this case the action
of the court setting aside the stipulation of
counsel as to the facts was an abuse of discretion
which the appellate court must set aside.'' Citing
Keen vs. Robertson, 46 Nebr. 837, 65 N. W. 897,
which holds: "When their enforcement would
result in serious injury to one of the parties and
the other party would not be prejudiced by being
set aside.''
Lewis vs. Sumner, 13 Met. (Mass.) 269.
Lincoln vs. Lincoln St. R. Co., 67 Nebr. 469,
93 N. W. 766 where it was_ held: "In sustaining
the ruling of the trial court in refusing to relieve
plaintiff therefrom the Court among other things
said: 'It would also seem that the application
came too late to be entertained by the Court. The
plaintiff had made its case and rested. It put in
evidence all of the stipulation except the portion
of it which defendants were attempting to introduce, and it would have been injust at that stage
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of the proceedings to deny defendants the benefit
of these paragraphs. Yet counsel insist that the
Court, in the exercise of its discretion, ought to
have sustained the objection and granted the
request; the result would have been a mistrial.
It would have rendered it necessary to retry the
whole case, and to require this to be done would
have been an abuse of discretion.' ''
There has been a loose use of the word" stipulation"
in this proceedings, to wit: Where Commissioner Knerr
asks Mr. Olmstead if he will stipulate to certain matters.
According to the usual use of that word, a stipulation
is an agreement between counsel respecting business
before a Court. It would be peculiar for one side to
enter into a stipulation with the Court as to the facts.
Here the only explanation would be that as the applicant
did not have an attorney present, the Commissioner tried
to simplify the hearing by getting certain matters
settled and thereby, in a way, keep the hearing from being
one sided. At any rate, the only matters labeled as
stipulations are as set forth above, and they must be
what the counsel referred to when he asked to withdraw
his stipulations. They certainly did not withdraw their
admissions.
In their argument, plaintiffs claim as follows: ''In
the case at bar the stipulation was withdrawn without
objection from anyone. The commission accepted the
withdrawal of the stipulation by adjourning· the case
to permit the introduction of testimony which showed the
stipulation to be untrue, and did permit the introduction
of such testimony. This testimony was not objected to
by anyone, and is the only positive evidence in the record

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
as to the time, place and circumstances of any injury to
Mr. Hansen."
We now refer to that testimony and how it was
received. In the first place, it came when for the first
time the aplicants had an attorney present and the record
shows that that attorney could have had no knowledge
as to what the record showed as to any admissions or
stipulations and as the law says, 42-1-82, that "The
Commission shall not be bound by the usual common law
or statutory rules of evidence, or by any mechanical
or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided, but may make its investigations in such manner
as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly
the spirit of this title."
The Commission could have applied the wording
of the statute set forth in 104-49-2, Sub. 3, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and disregarded the whole of
this evidence on which the plaintiffs herein rely and
very justly have done so. The only other person who
could have known of the truth or falsity of the evidence
was dead and the law put on the plaintiffs the burden
of investigating aceidents to its employees ( 42-1-92) and
they made such an investigation, and made the report to
the Commission, as is shown in page 1 of the record, and
admitted that the accident on which the proceedings were
had under Mr. Hansen's application for compensation
was granted and paid. If this testimony had then been
offered, Mr. Hansen was alive to have met what is said
about an accident on March 20, 1938, by this witness
and probably explained what this witness terms ''a
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terrible jolt" and why he saw fit then to say anything
about any injuries he was suffering from, and from what
a,ccident they arose.
This testimony does not show, in any way, that
Mr. Hansen had not been injured on March 17, 1938,
just as the proof offered showed, and also admitted by
the plaintiffs' attorney in this hearing as is above set
forth. The Commission had all of this and also the
testimony of the doctors who were fully informed as to
what the condition of Mr. Hansen then was and theresults from that testimony. The record clearly shows
that Mr. Hansen was at all times trying to do the work
to which he was assigned and from which he was earning
$240.00 per month with which to support his dependents,
and consequently even if he was suffering from that
injury of March 17, 1938, he tried to carry on, and that
he was not a man to talk about his sufferings. On page
19 of the testimony taken at Ogden his wife, in answer
to a question as to what she knew of his condition between
November and when he came back in March from California, said: ''He never mentioned anything to me.''
Section 42-1-79, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
reads : ''The findings and conclusion of the Commission
of questions of fact shall be conclusive and final and
shall not be subject to review, etc.''
If the contention of the plaintiffs, that the Commission had to permit the withdrawal of their stipulations, be accepted by this Court as the law, then this
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Court should return the whole matter to the Industrial
Commission for an entire rehearing. Unless such an
order should be made under the circumstances presented
here, the respondent would be placed at a disadvantage
never contemplated by the legislature, because the
respondent, in the first place, was without information
as to the effect of a withdrawal of the testimony, and
secondly, no real reason was given or proved to justify
the withdrawal. As a matter of fact, the withdrawal
of the stipulation would not, in any sense, disprove that
an accident occurred on the 17th of March, 1938, nor
would it have any effect in disproving that the deceased
had been compensation without objection by the plaintiffs
up to June 1, 1938. If there is any disposition on the
part of the Court to consider that insufficient evidence
was before the Commission to justify its award to defendant Olga Lassen Hansen, then in that event the
only logical conclusion must be that the matter should be
referred to the Industrial Commission for the taking of
additional testimony.
We submit that the Industrial Commission was
justified in making the award that there was ample proof
by admission of the appellants' counsel and by its officers in the report of the accident, that such an accident
had occurred and that it did occur in the course of
employment of the deceased even if there were nothing
else in the record, and that as a result the action of the
Industrial Commission should be approved. However,
if there shall be any question with reference thereto,
then it is respectfully submitted that the matter should
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be referred to the Industrial Commission for the taking
of further testimony.
Respectfully submitted,

DAN B. SHIELDS
GEO.G.ARMSTRONG
Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

